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		 The	2001	debt	crisis	in	Argentina	adversely	affected	Argentina’s	economy	and	the	Argentine	life.	Throughout	the	misery	of	hyperinflation,	high	unemployment,	and	poverty,	Argentina	faced	constant	demands	for	repayment	from	private	creditors.	A	wave	of	populist	governance	offered	two	debt	restructuring	rounds	but	refused	to	pay	back	the	holdout	creditors	that	rejected	the	terms	of	the	deal.	A	US	order	that	prohibited	Argentina	from	accessing	international	markets	until	it	repaid	the	holdout	creditors	dragged	down	the	economy	after	many	years	of	economic	growth.	Frustrated	by	the	country’s	economic	state,	the	Argentine	people	elected	a	center-right	candidate	to	presidency,	who	ultimately	negotiated	a	deal	with	the	holdout	creditors	and	led	the	country	to	access	international	capital	markets	for	the	first	time	in	15	years.	This	paper	evaluates	(1)	the	history	of	the	debt	crisis,	(2)	the	rise	of	populist	governance	as	a	response	to	the	distressed	economy,	(3)	the	evolution	of	the	legal	dispute	with	the	holdout	creditors,	(4)	the	election	of	Mauricio	Macri	and	the	economic	impact	of	his	resolution	with	the	holdouts,	and	(5)	how	Argentina	hopes	to	attract	foreign	investment	as	it	enters	a	new	era	of	financial	and	economic	reform.	
1. History	of	the	2001	Debt	Crisis		 Argentina	faced	its	most	severe	economic	crisis	in	2001,	considered	to	be	history’s	largest	sovereign	debt	default.		A	mix	of	factors—from	macroeconomic	policies	to	bad	IMF	policy	advice	regarding	international	lending	strategies—contributed	to	the	crisis.		On	the	national	front,	the	return	to	democracy	from	military	rule	as	well	as	protectionist	economic	policies1	placed	Argentina	in	a	vulnerable	position	as	it	sought	to	restructure	its	economy	
                                                
1 Argentina went through a six-year period of military dictatorship from 1976-82. Prior to the 
dictatorship, Argentina’s economic structure was based on the import substitution model, an 
economic model that emphasizes domestic production and reduces dependence on foreign 
imports, that was implemented during Juan Domingo Perón’s governance in the 1940s. This 
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during	the	1980s	and	1990s.	After	the	country	emerged	from	the	dictatorship,	Argentina	suffered	massive	hyperinflation	at	340%	and	external	debt	of	$46	billion	representing	80%	of	its	GDP.2		Economic	policies	by	the	democratically	elected	president	Raul	Alfonsín	sought	to	restructure	the	economy	primarily	by	targeting	hyperinflation	and	implementing	wage	and	price	controls	through	the	Austral	Plan.3	Initially,	the	Austral	Plan	was	successful	in	reducing	the	monthly	inflation	rate	and	received	support	from	the	IMF	in	the	form	of	a	$1.2	million	loan.4	However,	Alfonsín’s	economic	policies	did	not	fare	well	with	the	unions	who	desired	an	increase	in	compensation	to	counteract	wage	controls.5	Eventually,	the	economic	team’s	policy	to	shift	between	fixed	and	flexible	exchange	rates	as	well	as	attempts	to	privatize	the	domestic	market	did	not	tackle	hyperinflation	or	spur	economic	growth.6	In	fact,	the	end	of	the	Alfonsín	government	resulted	in	more	hyperinflation,	high	unemployment,	fallout	with	the	unions,	and	political	instability.7	The	failure	of	Alfonsín’s	government	to	restructure	the	economy	and	target	hyperinflation	paved	the	way	for	Carlos	
                                                
protectionist model continued its reign through the 1970s and 1980s and eventually resulted in an 
overvalued currency, uncompetitive industrial market, hyperinflation and dependence on foreign 
intermediate goods in order to sustain the domestic industrial structure. Grugel, Jean and Maria 
Pia Riggirozzi. “The Return of the State in Argentina.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-) 83.1 (2007): 87-107, pg. 89 
2 Smith, William C. “Democracy, Distributional Conflicts, and Macroeconomic Policymaking in 
Argentina 1983-89.” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 32.2 (1990): 1-42, pg. 
3. 
3 The Austral Plan sought to eliminate the structural causes of inflation (protectionist policies and 
overvalued exchange rates) through heterodox shock policies that focused on a “wholesale de-
indexation of prices in both the public and private sectors” as well as monetary reform through 
wage and price controls. This stabilization process, along with a moderate wage policy and 
privatization of the market, was expected to reduce inflation. Id., pg. 10.  
4 Id., pg. 11.  
5 Id., pg. 13. 
6 Id., pg. 15-25. 
7 Grugel, pg. 90. 
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Menem	to	assume	the	presidency	and	push	for	neoliberal	economic	policies	during	the	period	of	rapid	globalization.		 The	key	feature	of	Menem’s	economic	restructuring	plan	was	the	infamous	Convertibility	Plan,	which	pegged	the	Argentine	peso	on	a	one-to-one	fixed	exchange	rate	to	the	US	dollar.8	Success	of	the	plan	required	monetary	and	fiscal	policies	to	be	restrained	either	by	eliminating	the	government	deficit	or	financing	the	deficit	through	debt.9	Initially,	the	plan	was	successful	in	reducing	inflation	to	less	than	5%	by	1995.10	During	this	period,	Argentina	had	greater	access	to	international	markets	and	attracted	foreign	investment	of	$11	billion	in	1992	and	1993.		Capital	inflow	into	Argentina	resulted	in	an	average	economic	growth	rate	of	4.5%	from	1991-95.11		Additionally,	Menem	decentralized	the	government	as	a	means	to	reduce	central	state	spending	through	the	privatization	of	public	services	and	utilities	as	well	as	control	on	the	labor	movement.12			 Although	Menem’s	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	were	successful	during	the	first	half	of	his	presidency,	the	economy	took	a	sharp	downturn	after	1995.	The	Convertibility	Plan,	responsible	for	the	decrease	in	inflation,	was	the	main	reason	behind	the	economic	collapse	during	the	mid	to	late	1990s.	While	the	plan	required	a	significant	decrease	in	fiscal	spending,	the	national	and	provincial	governments	were	unable	to	restrain	their	fiscal	deficits	to	the	levels	required	by	the	plan.	Moreover,	the	Argentine	debt	service	ratio	grew	
                                                
8 The Convertibility Plan was enacted in April of 1991. The plan permitted conversion of pesos 
to dollars at the 1:1 fixed rate and restricted the printing of currency to “amounts supported by its 
reserve position (which could fluctuate with the amount of dollars entering or leaving the 
country).” Hornbeck, J.F. “Argentina’s Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing with the ‘Holdouts.’” 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, CRS R41029. 6 Feb. 2013. pg. 2.  
9 Id.  
10 Grugel, pg. 91. 
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
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from	30%	in	1995	to	66%	in	2001	and	the	Argentine	peso	became	greatly	overvalued.13	Argentina’s	competitiveness	in	the	foreign	market	decreased	and	the	country	did	not	retain	sufficient	revenue	to	finance	its	debt.14		Public	revenue	fell	further	when	investor	confidence	in	emerging	markets	deteriorated,	resulting	in	massive	capital	flight.15	The	rigidness	of	the	Convertibility	Plan	prohibited	the	government	from	devaluing	its	currency	in	order	to	increase	exports	and	make	Argentina	more	competitive	in	the	foreign	market.16			 In	addition	to	the	failure	of	the	Convertibility	Plan,	external	factors	pushed	Argentina	as	well	as	the	world	economy	into	economic	trouble.		Credit	agencies	overstated	Argentina’s	strengths	and	international	creditors	made	generous	loans	to	Argentina	despite	the	risk	factors.	The	IMF	also	had	a	role	to	play	in	the	lending	problems	by	supporting	loan	agreements	that	were	based	on	unrealistically	optimistic	assumptions	about	Argentina’s	economy.		Moreover,	the	IMF	failed	to	adequately	monitor	the	Argentine	economic	situation	and	permitted	an	unsustainable	amount	of	lending	during	the	years	of	1991-2001.17	In	addition	to	problems	created	by	external	agencies,	the	economic	crises	and	policy	changes	in	other	countries	contributed	to	Argentina’s	economic	turmoil.		During	the	late	1990s,	the	1997	Asian	crisis,	the	1998	Russian	crisis	and	currency	devaluation	by	Brazil	(Argentina’s	major	trading	partner)	further	strained	the	Argentine	economy,	leaving	Argentina	in	a	desperate,	unsustainable	position.18				
                                                
13 Hornbeck, CRS R41029, pg. 2.  
14 Id.  
15 Grugel, pg. 92. 
16 Additionally, Argentina was unable to engage in fiscal spending, due to its excessive debt, nor 
reduce fiscal spending for fear of deepening the recession. Thus, domestically, Argentina was 
left without any tools to prevent the country from sliding into deeper recession. Hornbeck, pg. 2.  
17 Id. 
18 Grugel, pg. 92. 
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	 The	combination	of	all	of	these	factors	pushed	Argentina	to	default	on	its	debt	in	December	of	2001.19	The	aftermath	of	the	default	led	to	great	political	instability	and	social	turmoil.		For	a	two-week	period	in	December	2001,	five	presidents	took	office.		Savings	accounts	of	Argentineans	were	frozen	and	money	in	the	accounts	was	converted	from	dollars	into	highly	devalued	pesos.		Additionally,	unemployment	reached	around	25%	of	the	workforce	and	poverty	levels	hit	44%.20	Along	with	internal	strife,	Argentina	was	facing	problems	with	foreign	investors	in	international	arbitration.	By	2013,	there	were	42	ICSID21	claims	pending	against	Argentina,	the	majority	due	to	emergency	measures	taken	by	Argentina	to	expropriate	previous	private	investments	in	the	gas	industry	in	order	to	stabilize	the	economy	during	the	2001	debt	crisis.22		The	international	tribunal	awarded	judgments	against	Argentina,	two	of	which	resulted	in	damages	in	excess	of	$100	million.23		In	the	midst	of	internal	turmoil	and	external	pressure	by	foreign	investors,	the	Argentine	people	sought	a	new	government	that	shifted	away	from	neoliberal	policy	and	returned	back	to	Argentina’s	Peronist	roots.				
                                                
19 A sovereign debt default occurs when a government is unable or unwilling to pay the debt it 
has acquired on the international credit markets.  
20 Martinez, Elizabeth A. “Understanding the Debate over Necessity: Unanswered Questions and 
Future Implications of Annulments in the Argentine Gas Cases.” 23 Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law 149-86 (2012), at 154. 
21 Formed in 1966, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is an 
international arbitration tribunal that settles disputes between foreign investors and state 
governments concerning international investment disputes. 
22 Hornbeck, J.F. “Argentina’s Post-Crisis Economic Reform: Challenges for U.S. Policy.” 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, CRS R43022. 15 Apr. 2013. pg., 15.  
23 In 2007, ICSID awarded a judgment of $132 million in damages in favor of CMS Gas 
Transmission Company of Michigan for losses incurred due to the emergency laws imposed by 
Argentina. Additionally, in 2009, ICSID awarded another judgment of $165 million in damages 
in favor of Azurix Corporation for a water and sewage contract. Argentina declined to pay the 
damages in order to prevent an influx of future ICSID claims. Id.   
 6 
2. The	Entry	and	Rule	of	Peronist	Governance		 The	2001	economic	crisis	bred	mistrust	among	Argentineans	in	international	markets	and	neoliberal	policies.		Alarming	rates	of	unemployment	and	poverty	motivated	the	‘new	poor’	to	protest	against	the	neoliberal	model	and	advocate	for	a	return	to	Peronist	politics.	Trade	unions	and	the	‘new	poor’	took	to	the	streets	to	protest	the	adverse	consequences	of	the	neoliberal	model	and	eventually	influenced	President	Duhalde	in	2002	to	institute	Peronist	policies,	namely	the	reintroduction	of	a	state-sponsored	social	safety	net.24	Additionally,	President	Duhalde	abandoned	the	Convertibility	Plan	and	converted	bank	deposits	and	debt	into	pesos,	which	devalued	the	currency	and	stimulated	the	domestic	industry	for	the	first	time	in	15	years.25			 Moreover,	President	Duhalde	continued	with	his	commitment	to	implement	Peronist	policies	through	the	introduction	of	social	dialogue	programs	that	encouraged	citizens	from	all	sectors	of	society	to	voice	their	opinions	on	social	programs.	Societal	dialogue	led	to	the	creation	of	the	Program	for	Male	and	Female	Unemployed	Households	(Programa	Jefas	y	Jefes	de	Hogares	Desempleados),	which	provided	households	an	income	of	150	pesos	per	month	(US$50)	in	exchange	for	participation	in	community	service,	construction	and	small-scale	production	projects.26	The	tide	was	shifting	in	the	direction	of	a	government	that	provided	a	more	active	role	for	the	state	and	the	reimplementation	of	the	social	and	economic	rights	the	Argentine	people	were	accustomed	to	during	Peronist	governance.		
                                                
24 Grugel, pg. 95. 
25 Id. 
26 The purpose of this program was to assist workers with low wages whose interests did not 
align with the unions or with traditional wage workers. Id., pg. 96. 
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	 With	citizen	support	for	Peronist	policies,	Nestor	de	Kirchner	assumed	office	in	2003	with	an	agenda	to	rebuild	Argentina’s	industrial	base	and	public	services	as	well	as	foster	a	more	active	role	for	the	state	to	tackle	economic	issues.	Regarding	economic	policy,	Kirchner	continued	the	policy	of	peso	devaluation,	which	had	the	effect	of	increasing	Argentina’s	exports.27		Kirchner	was	able	to	raise	public	revenues	through	an	increase	in	export	taxes	and	by	withholding	the	debt	repayment	to	the	IMF	until	2006.		Additionally,	Kirchner	tackled	inflation	through	negotiations	between	the	government	and	producers	to	foster	‘voluntary’	price	controls	on	the	part	of	the	producers.28	Throughout	Kirchner’s	reign	as	president,	Argentina’s	economy	grew	at	an	annual	average	rate	of	8%	(through	2008).	Kirchner’s	policies	also	moved	11	million	out	of	poverty,	from	a	previous	high	of	39	million,	and	reduced	the	unemployment	rate	from	21.5%	in	2002	to	9.6%	in	2007.29			 In	2008,	Cristina	Fernández,	Kirchner’s	wife,	became	president	and	continued	with	and	expanded	the	Peronist	policies	promoted	by	Kirchner.	Argentina	experienced	increased	economic	growth	by	the	end	of	her	first	term,	primarily	due	to	a	strengthened	domestic	sector	and	external	factors	(such	as	trade	with	Brazil).	Additionally,	Fernández’s	policies	focused	on	reducing	the	unemployment	rate	and	poverty.		She	also	focused	on	social	welfare	programs	by	launching	the	Universal	Child	Allowance	(Asignación	Universal	por	Hijo),	a	program	that	allocates	a	certain	amount	of	money	for	each	child	under	18	to	
                                                
27 Id., pg. 97 
28 Whether the price controls were ‘voluntary’ remains subject to debate. The government sought 
to maintain the price controls through “a constant practice of monitoring and warning by 
government of the danger of pushing prices up.” Id., pg. 98.  
29 Weisbrot, Mark and Luis Sandoval. “Argentina’s Economic Recovery: Policy Choices and 
Implications.” Center for Economic and Policy Research. Oct. 2007. pg. 5.  
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families	dealing	with	unemployment	or	underemployment.30		Due	to	the	success	of	her	populist	policies	in	stimulating	the	economy	and	reducing	poverty,	Fernández	easily	won	a	second	term.	The	successes	of	the	Kirchner	administration	and	the	first	half	of	the	Fernández	administration	strengthened	the	role	for	the	state	in	determining	economic	policy	and	returned	Argentine	politics	to	the	Peronist	ideology.		
3. The	Debt	Restructuring	Deals	and	Holdout	Dispute		 Although	Kirchner’s	and	Fernández’s	policies	produced	economic	growth	and	revitalized	the	economy,	they	could	not	ignore	the	repayment	demands	by	international	creditors	from	the	economic	crisis.		At	the	time	of	the	default,	Argentina	owed	private	investors	who	held	bonds	$81.8	billion,	the	IMF	$9.5	billion,	and	the	Paris	Club	countries31	$6.3	billion.32		Beginning	in	2002,	Argentina	began	the	process	of	debt	restructuring33	and	negotiating	with	the	IMF	and	investors	to	develop	a	repayment	plan.	After	three	years	of	negotiation,	Argentina	suspended	talks	with	the	IMF	and	acted	on	its	own	to	reach	a	solution	for	private	creditors.34	Additionally,	Argentina	passed	the	“Lock	Law”	(Ley	Cerrojo)	in	2005,	which	“prohibited	the	government	from	reopening	the	exchange	or	making	any	kind	of	future	offer	on	better	terms,	and	suspended	future	payment	on	the	
                                                
30 Stocker, Ed. “Argentine Strength’ Carrying Cristina Fernández to Presidential Re-Election.” 
The North American Congress on Latin America. 23 Oct. 2011. 
31 The Paris Club is a group of 19 countries who assist in negotiating debt relief for developing 
nations that have difficulty meeting their debt obligations by restructuring or reducing the debt 
that is owed to them.  
32 Hornbeck, CRS R41029, pg. 3.  
33 Debt restructuring involves, “a formal and legal change in contractual agreements of the debt, 
such as reducing the face value of the obligations, issuing new bonds with lower interest rates 
and longer maturities, and capitalizing overdue interest, usually a sizeable loss to bondholders.” 
A successful debt restructuring typically involves a 90% participation rate from investors that 
offers at least 50% of the net present value on debt. Id., pg. 4.  
34 Bypassing IMF assistance, Argentina filed a one-time unilateral offer with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in order to reach a settlement with private creditors. Id., pg. 5.  
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untendered	debt.”35	This	had	the	effect	of	ensuring	that	participants	in	the	restructuring	deal	would	receive	payments	on	the	same	terms	as	any	bondholders	in	future	deals	and	incentivized	a	higher	participation	rate	in	the	debt	restructuring	process.		 In	January	of	2005,	Argentina	began	its	first	round	of	debt	restructuring.		The	first	round	attracted	a	76%	participation	rate	from	private	creditors,	and	Argentina	was	able	to	exchange	$62.3	billion	for	$35.2	billion	of	new	bonds	of	the	$81.8	billion	debt.36		The	terms	were	not	very	favorable	to	the	creditors,	who	received	new	bonds	worth	30-35	cents	on	the	dollar.37	However,	Argentina	took	a	strong	position	and	argued	that	everyone	involved	in	the	debt	crisis,	including	bondholders,	needed	to	take	a	hit	and	share	in	the	misery	of	Argentina’s	distressed	economic	situation.38	Moreover,	the	bondholders	of	the	first	restructuring	plan	received	returns	of	approximately	90%	by	2012.39				 After	the	first	round	of	debt	restructuring,	Argentina	still	needed	to	repay	24%	of	the	private	creditors,	the	IMF	and	the	Paris	Club	countries.	On	January	3,	2006,	Argentina	repaid	$9.5	billion	owed	to	the	IMF	in	order	to	relieve	itself	from	any	IMF	policy	constraints.	40	Additionally,	Argentina	reached	a	deal	in	May	29,	2014	to	pay	the	Paris	Club	countries	arrears	of	$9.7	billion	in	installments	over	a	five-year	period	from	2015-2020.41	In	2009,	Argentina	began	the	second	round	of	the	debt	restructuring	process	for	private	
                                                
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 The Economist. “A Victory by Default?” The Economist. 3 Mar. 2005.  
38 Hornbeck, CRS R41029, pg. 4. 
39 Benson, Drew. “Billionaire Hedge Fund Snubs 90% Returns.” Bloomberg News. 23 Jan. 2012. 
40 Hornbeck, CRS R41029, pg. 5. 
41 BBC News. “Argentina in Deal with Paris Club to Pay $10 Billion Debts.” BBC News. 29 May 
2014. Argentina paid its first installment of $650 million to the Paris Club countries in July of 
2014. Buenos Aires Herald. “Government Pre-Pays Paris Club as a Sign of Good Faith over 
Default.” Buenos Aires Hearld. 29 Jul. 2014. Moreover, Argentina is current with its payments 
to the Paris Club countries as of March 31, 2016. Barnato, Katy. “Argentina Set to Launch Bond, 
End Hedge Fund Battle.” CNBC News. 31 Mar. 2016.   
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bondholders.		Prior	to	the	bond	exchange,	on	November	18,	2009,	the	Argentine	legislature	temporarily	suspended	a	portion	of	the	Lock	Law	that	prohibited	any	reopening	or	a	debt	restructuring	offering.		Furthermore,	in	December	of	2009,	Argentina	filed	a	preliminary	prospectus	with	the	SEC,	which	had	the	effect	of	approving	Argentina’s	request	to	issue	new	bonds.42	These	two	actions	by	the	Argentine	government	paved	the	way	for	the	second	round	of	debt	restructuring.	The	bond	exchange	opened	on	April	30,	2010	and	closed	on	June	22,	2010	as	well	as	a	second	stage	that	closed	on	December	31,	2010.	In	this	round,	$12.8	billion	of	$18.4	billion	in	bonds	were	exchanged,	representing	a	93%	participation	rate	of	private	investors	and	91.3%	participation	rate	of	total	defaulted	debt.43	7%	of	the	bondholders	rejected	the	restructuring	deals	and	chose	to	pursue	litigation	in	US	courts.		 The	7%	bondholders,	termed	the	holdouts,	acquired	the	Argentine	bonds	when	the	value	of	the	bonds	significantly	declined	after	the	2001	debt	crisis.	A	majority	of	the	holdouts	were	hedge	funds	that	specialize	in	purchasing	highly	discounted	debt	in	order	to	acquire	a	profit	as	the	value	of	the	bond	rises	in	the	future.44	Arguing	that	the	terms	of	the	restructuring	deals	were	not	favorable	to	creditors,	the	holdouts	pursued	litigation	in	New	York.45	The	Argentine	bonds	were	drafted	by	Argentina’s	US	attorney	and	are	governed	under	New	York	law	in	order	to	attract	investors	into	purchasing	Argentina	bonds.	Additionally,	the	Argentine	bonds	contained	a	pari	passu	clause,	meaning	that	the	bonds	a	bondholder	buys	are	given	equal	treatment	to	all	other	bonds	issued	by	Argentina.	Thus,	
                                                
42 Hornbeck, CRS R43022, pg. 6. 
43 Id., pg. 7. 
44 Id., pg. 4. 
45 Typically, the strategy pursued by these kinds of hedge funds involves “realizing capital gains 
on discounted bonds, often purchased after the default, and settling with the debtor country for a 
much higher price than paid in the secondary market.” Id., pg. 8. 
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there	cannot	be	discriminatory	treatment	among	creditors	in	the	repayment	of	bonds.46		Moreover,	the	bonds	did	not	include	a	collective	action	clause,	a	clause	that	legally	requires	all	bondholders	to	accept	the	terms	of	a	debt	restructuring	if	a	supermajority	of	the	bondholders	agree	to	the	terms.			 NML	Capital	Limited,	a	prominent	hedge	fund	and	holdout	creditor,	pursued	litigation	in	New	York	court,	arguing	for	the	enforcement	of	the	pari	passu	clause.	There	are	two	common	interpretations	of	the	pari	passu	clause:	a	narrow	one	and	a	wide	one.	The	narrow	interpretation	requires	that	obligations	legally	rank	pari	passu,	meaning	that	a	sovereign	can	discriminate	between	creditors	as	long	as	there	is	no	mandatory	law	that	authorizes	the	discrimination.	The	wide	interpretation	prevents	a	sovereign	nation	from	making	any	unequal	payments	if	they	are	insolvent	or	in	debt	default.		An	opinion	by	Judge	Thomas	Griesa	of	the	Second	Circuit	court	on	October	26,	2012	adopted	the	wide	interpretation	of	the	pari	passu	clause.47		Griesa	argued	that	legislative	actions	by	the	Argentine	government,	including	the	passage	of	the	Lock	Law,	violated	the	pari	passu	clause	because	it	made	the	non-payment	to	holdouts	mandatory	by	law.	The	decision	stated	that	Argentina	was	required	to	pay	either	all	of	the	bondholders	or	none	of	them,	and	could	not	discriminate	repayment	based	on	participation	in	the	2005	and	2010	debt	
                                                
46 Allen & Overy. “The Pari Passu Clause and the Argentine Case.”Allen & Overy. 27 Dec. 
2012. pg. 2. 
47 Specifically, the pari passu clause was stated as follows: “the Securities will 
constitute…direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic and 
shall at all times rank pari passu without any preference among themselves. The payment 
obligations of the Republic under the Securities shall at all times rank at least equally with all its 
other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness.” Argentina argued 
that the pari passu clause only applied to the first sentence regarding bonds of that particular 
issue. However, the Second Circuit ruled that the pari passu clause applied to both sentences, 
meaning that bonds rank equally among themselves as well as with external debt. Thus, the new 
bonds issued by Argentina also ranked pari passu with the old bonds that were held by the 
holdouts. See NML Capital Ltd., v. Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012).  
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restructurings.48		Thus,	Argentina	was	prevented	from	paying	the	holders	of	new	bonds	unless	it	also	paid	the	holdouts	for	their	old	bonds.			 In	addition	to	the	ruling	on	the	pari	passu	clause,	the	Argentine	bonds	contained	a	RUFO	(“Rights	Upon	Future	Offers”)	clause.	The	RUFO	clause	states	that	if	Argentina	reaches	a	better	agreement	with	future	bondholders,	the	other	bondholders	have	the	right	to	demand	the	same	terms.	The	term	of	the	RUFO	clause	was	through	December	31,	2014.	Essentially,	if	Argentina	would	have	reached	a	better	agreement	with	the	holdouts	prior	to	December	31,	2014,	the	creditors	who	participated	in	the	2005	and	2010	restructuring	deals	had	the	right	to	demand	repayment	on	the	same	terms	as	the	holdouts.49	The	2012	decision	by	Griesa	required	Argentina	to	pay	the	holdouts	in	full;	thus,	the	fear	was	that	Argentina	would	be	required	to	pay	back	all	private	creditors	in	full,	an	amount	that	the	economy	could	not	support.	Moreover,	Judge	Griesa	issued	an	injunction	against	Argentina	in	2014	prohibiting	the	country	from	accessing	international	capital	markets	from	issuing	new	bonds	or	servicing	its	restructured	debt	until	it	pays	back	all	of	the	debt	that	is	owed,	particularly	to	the	holdouts.50	Due	to	heavy	financial	pressure,	Argentina	defaulted	on	its	debt	for	a	second	time	in	July	of	2014.51			 The	Argentine	government’s	reaction	to	Griesa’s	decision	was	very	negative.	President	Fernández	refused	to	pay	the	holdouts	and	argued	that	these	vulture	funds’	(a	term	she	used	to	describe	the	holdouts)	demand	for	repayment	would	destabilize	the	
                                                
48 Allen & Overy, pg. 4-5.  
49 The Economist. “Argentina Debt: Let’s Not Make a Deal.” The Economist. 3 Jan. 2015.  
50 Van Voris, Bob and Katia Porzencanski. “Argentina Debt Injunction to be Lifted in Blow to 
Hedge Funds.” Bloomberg News. 16 Feb. 2016. 
51 The Economist.  
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Argentine	economy,	resulting	in	more	poverty	and	economic	misery.52		She	maintained	her	position	throughout	the	end	of	2015,	the	end	of	her	presidency.		Although	some	in	Buenos	Aires	respected	her	position	to	withhold	payments	to	the	holdouts,	the	dire	state	of	the	economy	by	201553	persuaded	many	to	consider	a	change	in	government.		
4. Macri’s	Presidency	and	Solution	to	the	Holdout	Dispute		 The	2015	presidential	election	was	a	big	moment	for	the	Argentine	people	to	decide	the	future	of	their	country	and,	importantly,	their	economy.	Campaigning	under	a	platform	to	change	the	country’s	political	institutions	and	revitalize	the	economy,	on	November	22,	2015,	the	center-right	candidate	Mauricio	Macri	won	the	presidential	election.	Macri’s	victory	came	as	a	surprise	for	many.	During	the	first	round	of	elections	held	in	October,	Macri	was	able	to	pull	off	a	close	second	place	result	behind	the	Peronist	candidate,	Daniel	Scioli.54	The	close	result	and	the	first	ever-presidential	run-off	was	unexpected	by	many	who	assumed	that	Scioli	would	easily	win	the	election.	However,	on	November	22,	2015,	the	Argentine	people	voted	to	elect	Macri	into	office,	the	first	president	in	almost	100	years	who	is	not	associated	with	the	Peronist	party	or	ideology.55			 After	assuming	office	on	December	10,	2015,	Macri	worked	quickly	to	reverse	many	of	the	policies	of	his	predecessor,	Cristina	Fernández.		Apart	from	relaxing	currency	
                                                
52 Van Voris.  
53 Isolation from international markets worsened Argentina’s economy, resulting in around 30% 
inflation, a large fiscal deficit and few reserves.	Wernau, Julia and Taos Turner. “Argentina Debt 
Deal Poised to Deliver Big Payday to Holdouts.” The Wall Street Journal. 29 Feb. 2016.  
54 After the first round of elections, Daniel Scioli (Frente para la victoria) received 36.7% of the 
vote and Mauricio Macri received 34.5% of the vote. The Argentine electoral system requires 
that a presidential candidate receive either 45% of the vote or 40% of the vote with a 10% lead 
over the second place candidate. This was the first time in Argentina’s political history that the 
country was set for a presidential run-off. BBC News. “Argentina Goes to Polls in First Ever 
Presidential Run-Off.” BBC News. 22 Nov. 2015. 
55 Macri received 51.4% of the votes compared to Scioli’s 48.6% in the presidential run-off. The 
Economist. “Argentina’s New President: The End of Populism.” The Economist. 28 Nov. 2015.  
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exchange	controls	and	lifting	export	taxes,	Macri	also	negotiated	a	deal	with	the	holdouts	in	order	to	end	the	economic	misery	that	Argentina	was	suffering.	In	February	of	2016,	Argentina	agreed	to	pay	a	group	of	Italian	bondholders	$1.35	billion	and	$1.1	billion	to	two	of	the	six	holdout	firms.56	On	February	19,	2016,	Judge	Griesa,	noting	the	change	the	Macri	government	has	brought	in	dealing	with	the	holdouts,	announced	that	he	would	lift	the	injunction	on	access	to	international	capital	markets	if	Argentina	repealed	domestic	laws,	including	the	Lock	Law,	that	prevent	Argentina	from	making	payments	to	the	holdouts.	Argentina	finally	reached	a	payment	plan	on	February	29,	2016	with	the	rest	of	the	holdouts	and	vowed	to	pay	them	back	$4.65	billion,	a	large	pay-off	for	the	investors	who	purchased	the	bonds	at	a	discounted	price.57		On	March	31,	2016,	Argentina’s	legislature	agreed	to	repeal	the	domestic	laws	that	prevented	repayment	to	the	holdouts58	and	the	Senate	approved	a	plan	that	permitted	Macri	to	issue	$12	billion	in	bonds	in	order	to	pay	back	the	holdouts.59	Members	of	the	opposing	Peronist	bloc	supported	the	holdout	repayment	plan	due	to	the	provinces’	need	for	vital	economic	reform.	Many	hoped	that	a	return	to	international	markets	would	attract	money	that	could	be	invested	in	various	domestic	industries.			 With	approval	to	pay	back	the	holdouts,	Argentina	returned	to	the	international	market	for	the	first	time	in	15	years	and	prepared	for	its	first	bond	sale	to	raise	money	for	repayment.	On	April	18,	2016,	Argentina	opened	its	first	bond	sale	and	attracted	interest	from	many	investors.	Although	investors	remained	cautious	about	purchasing	Argentine	
                                                
56 The Economist. “Argentina’s Debt: At Last.” The Economist. 5 Mar. 2016.  
57 Id. 
58 Mander, Benedict. “Argentina Clears Way for Repayment of ‘Holdout’ Creditors.” Financial 
Times. 31 Mar. 2016.  
59 Turner, Taos. “Argentine Senate Approves Plan to End Bondholder Dispute.” The Wall Street 
Journal. 31 Mar. 2016.  
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bonds,	the	positive	future	economic	outlook	and	higher	interest	rates	enticed	investors.60		The	outcome	of	the	bond	sale	was	overwhelmingly	positive,	and	Argentina	was	able	to	raise	$16.5	billion,61	sufficient	to	pay	back	the	bondholders.	Finally,	on	April	22,	2016,	Argentina	paid	back	$9.3	billion	to	all	holdouts.62	Under	Macri’s	leadership,	Argentina	finally	put	an	end	to	the	15-year	saga	with	the	hope	to	rouse	investor	interest	and	stimulate	the	economy.		 Opinions	about	Argentina’s	decision	to	pay	back	holdouts	have	been	mixed.	Many	commentators	have	noted	the	solution	to	the	holdout	problem	as	an	incredibly	positive	step	to	reform	Argentina’s	reputation	regarding	international	investment.	Once	it	became	evident	that	Macri	would	be	able	to	reach	a	deal	with	the	holdouts	after	receiving	approval	from	both	houses	in	the	Argentina	legislature,	the	market	greeted	the	news	with	optimism.63		For	international	investors,	the	end	of	the	holdout	dispute	and	Macri’s	proposed	economic	policies	sent	a	signal	to	the	world	that	Argentina	is	ready	to	enter	a	new	and	better	financial	era.	Additionally,	support	from	the	populace	as	well	as	members	of	the	Peronist	parties	to	approve	the	holdout	plan	indicates	that	the	country	is	ready	to	follow	Macri’s	lead	to	open	up	and	revitalize	the	Argentine	economy.64		
                                                
60 Gilbert, Jonathan. “Argentina Re-Enters International Bond Markets.” The New York Times. 
18 Apr. 2016.  
61 The Argentine bond sale was one of the largest by a sovereign in history. Regarding the sale, 
“demand was so high for Argentina’s four-part offering that the government…was able to 
narrow initial guidance on the 10-year debt by 50 basis points to 7.5%. Investors placed bids for 
almost $69 billion.” Pronina, Lyubov. “Argentina Opens Junk Bond Spree as Emerging Issuers 
Line Up.” Bloomberg News. 19 Apr. 2016.  
62 Stevenson, Alexandra. “How Argentina Settled a Billion-Dollar Debt Dispute with Hedge 
Funds.” The New York Times. 25 Apr. 2016.  
63 Sharma, Gaurav. “Argentina Heading for New Financial Era Under Mauricio Macri.” Forbes. 
31 Mar. 2016. 
64 Id. 
 16 
	 While	many	commentators	have	expressed	optimism,	others	have	argued	that	repayment	to	the	holdouts	may	set	a	bad	precedent	for	future	holdouts	in	seeking	solutions	from	insolvent	sovereigns.	Some	argue	that	the	resolution	of	the	holdouts	crisis	will	incentivize	creditors	to	reject	restructuring	deals	and	encourage	them	to	hold	out	in	order	to	seek	a	higher	price.		These	holdout	creditors	will	have	the	legal	backing	to	bully	insolvent	nations	who	are	desperate	to	reach	a	resolution	and	do	not	have	the	political	or	economic	power	to	withstand	the	dispute.65	The	holdouts	are	pursuing	a	legal	fight	to	demand	higher	payment	without	considering	the	negative	effects	these	actions	produce	on	the	country’s	economy	and	populace.	It	is	uncertain	whether	this	resolution	will	set	a	negative	precedent	and	incentivize	creditors	to	hold	out	in	future	debt	restructuring	deals.			 Opponents	on	the	other	side	counter	this	idea	by	arguing	that	the	market	has	solved	the	problem	through	the	introduction	of	collective	action	clauses,	which	are	now	included	in	almost	all	bond	contracts.66	Although	collective	action	clauses	have	the	potential	to	prevent	holdout	disputes,	this	will	only	work	if	a	supermajority	of	creditors	required	to	trigger	the	collective	action	clauses	is	willing	to	accept	the	debt	restructuring	deals.	For	example,	if	the	collective	action	clauses	require	a	90%	supermajority	to	trigger	the	clause	but	15%	of	the	creditors	prefer	to	hold	out,	then	this	may	lead	to	another	holdout	dispute.	For	now,	Argentina	has	included	the	collective	action	clauses	in	the	bond	contracts	of	its	
                                                
65 Guzman, Martin and Joseph E. Stiglitz. “How Hedge Funds Held Argentina for Ransom.” The 
New York Times. 1 Apr. 2016. 
66 The argument for collective action clauses is that holdout creditors will no longer be able to 
pursue litigation if they are forced to accept the debt restructuring deal that has already been 
accepted by a supermajority of the creditors. Hence, these kinds of holdout sagas should no 
longer occur, since almost all bond contracts contain collective action clauses. Worstall, Tim. 
“Where Guzman and Stiglitz Go Wrong about Argentina and Bond Holdouts.” Forbes. 1 Apr. 
2016.  
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recent	bond	sale.67	The	next	few	years	will	determine	the	effectiveness	of	the	collective	action	clauses	in	preventing	holdout	disputes.	
5. Future:	How	to	Persuade	Foreign	Investors	to	Invest	in	Argentina		 Although	many	investors	regard	the	holdout	solution	with	significant	progress	and	optimism,	the	issue	remains	how	Argentina	will	attract	foreign	investors	to	invest,	and	thus	revitalize,	Argentina’s	economy.	The	repayment	plan	to	the	holdouts	has	already	sent	a	positive	signal	to	the	market,	indicating	that	Macri’s	government	is	pushing	to	eradicate	his	predecessors’	policies	and	is	committed	to	attract	foreign	investment.	Macri	has	also	instituted	various	economic	policies—such	as	lifting	currency	controls	and	export	tariffs,	permitting	the	peso	to	float	and	thus	devaluing	it	by	30%	against	the	dollar,	permitting	access	to	the	foreign	exchange	market	and	tackling	inflation—with	the	intention	to	spur	economic	growth.68	Moreover,	Argentina’s	Labor	Minister,	Jorge	Triaca,	predicts	that	job	creation	should	begin	by	the	second	half	of	the	year	due	to	an	increase	in	foreign	investment	and	planned	investments	in	the	public	sector.69	Additionally,	Moody’s	decision	to	upgrade	Argentina’s	credit	rating	to	B3	from	Caa1	as	a	result	of	Macri’s	entry	into	office	
                                                
67 Gilbert.  
68 Winkler, Matthew. “Don’t Cry for Argentina’s Global Investors.” Chicago Tribune. 5 Apr. 
2016. 
69 In an interview with Reuters, Triaca stated, “In the second half of the year, we should start to 
see the impact of investment in both private and public works…in August or September.” This 
news will be positive for Argentine workers after Macri’s commitment to “trim government 
payrolls” resulted in layoffs of up to 10,000 workers in the public sector. Additionally, the 
private sector, primarily the construction industry, has lost an estimate of 45,000 jobs as well. 
Misculin, Nicolás. “Argentina Jobs recovery to Start in August: Minister.” Business Insider. 19 
Apr. 2016. 
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and	potential	economic	growth	will	assure	investors	that	investing	in	Argentina	is	less	risky	and	will	continue	to	be	less	risky	as	the	effects	of	Macri’s	economic	policies	unfold.70		 There	may	be	a	lot	of	excitement	around	the	future	of	Argentina,	but	the	short	term	has,	and	will	continue	to,	negatively	affect	the	economy.		Macri’s	economic	policy	to	allow	the	peso	to	float,	while	beneficial	in	the	long	term,71	has	pushed	up	inflation	and	will	continue	to	do	so	for	some	time.	Furthermore,	the	economy	is	expected	to	contract	by	0.5%	in	December	and	inflation,	according	to	some	estimates,	will	reach	40%.72		The	Argentine	people	are	suffering	from	high	prices	and	job	cuts;	thus,	along	with	the	desire	to	spur	investment	in	vital	industries,	Macri’s	agenda	to	tackle	inflation	should	also	consider	ways	to	accommodate	those	who	are	suffering	in	the	present.				 A	negotiated	solution	to	the	holdout	dispute	and	increased	investor	interest	also	has	the	potential	to	improve	relations	with	the	United	States.	During	President	Obama’s	visit	to	Argentina	in	late	March	2016,	Obama	mentioned	his	admiration	for	Macri’s	commitment	to	quickly	and	effectively	implement	economic	policies	to	encourage	foreign	investment	and	stimulate	economic	growth.	Additionally,	Obama	noted	his	delight	in	seeing	Argentina	
                                                
70 Moody’s Investors Service upgraded Argentina’s issuer rating to B3 from Caa1, Argentina’s 
foreign legislation and restructured local legislation foreign currency obligations to B3 from 
Caa2 and Argentina’s senior unsecured shelf rating to B3 from Caa1, all on April 15, 2016. 
Moody’s Investors Service. “Moody’s Upgrades Argentina’s Issuer Rating to B3 with a Stable 
Outlook.” Moody’s Investors Service. 15 Apr. 2016. Additionally, on April 21, 2016, Moody’s 
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Investors Service. “Moody’s Upgrades Argentina’s Financial Institutions Debt Ratings.” 
Moody’s Investors Service. 21 Apr. 2016. The rationale behind the policy upgrades is due to the 
resolution of the holdout dispute and economic policy improvements under Macri’s 
administration. 
71 The floating of the peso is expected to make Argentine exports more competitive as well as 
“reduce a drain on the central bank’s foreign-exchange reserves” in the near future. The 
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Everyday People.” Published in Star Tribune. 18 Apr. 2016. 
72 Id. 
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reenter	the	global	economy	and	optimism	for	improving	ties	between	the	two	nations.73	Along	with	President	Obama,	US	Secretary	of	Treasury	Jacob	J.	Lew	also	iterated	his	praise	for	Argentina’s	recent	economic	achievements	and	desire	to	see	Argentina	enter	the	global	financial	community.74	Lew	also	mentioned	the	United	States’	commitment	to	improve	the	sovereign	debt	restructuring	process	by	including	collective	action	clauses	that	will	prevent	future	holdout	disputes.75	With	the	United	States’	admiration	and	support,	there	is	hope	and	excitement	that	Argentina	and	the	United	States	will	enter	a	new	era	that	will	restore	and	promote	closer	political	and	economic	relations.				 Professionals	in	Argentina	discussed	the	need	for	Argentina	to	send	a	strong	signal	to	international	investors	in	order	to	attract	foreign	investment.	Investments	should	ideally	be	made	in	vital	industries	that	have	been	weakened	and	are	in	need	of	development.	The	major	industries	that	need	sufficient	investment	are	public	infrastructure	projects	(such	as	roads	and	bridges),	water,	oil,	gas,	energy,	and	other	natural	resources.	Investment	in	these	industries	will	lead	to	job	creation	and	stimulate	the	economy,	thus	attracting	foreign	investors	to	make	long-term	investments	in	the	country	once	they	realize	the	potential	payoffs	and	gains	from	investing	in	Argentina.		 Argentina	is	in	the	middle	of	a	transformative	period	and	has	the	potential	to	make	historic	changes	to	its	economy.	The	biggest	challenge	is	to	see	whether	access	to	
                                                
73 Sharma.  
74 Lew specifically stated, “Throughout my consultations with Finance Minister Prat-Gray, I 
have reiterated our admiration for the speed at which Argentina is moving to create more 
sustainable and economic growth, and to reconnect with the global economy and the world 
community. Argentina’s return to international capital markets and reintegration with the global 
economy represent a major milestone not only for Argentina but for the entire global financial 
system.” Lew, Jacob J. “Statement by Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew on Argentina’s Debt 
Repayment and Return to Global Capital Markets.” U.S. Department of Treasury Press Center. 
22 Apr. 2016.  
75 Id. 
 20 
international	markets	and	investment	in	vital	industries	will	spur	sustainable	economic	growth	that	will	attract	sufficient	foreign	investment	for	the	long	term.	Along	with	stimulating	economic	growth	and	enticing	foreign	investment,	Macri’s	economic	policies	must	also	tackle	inflation	so	that	the	Argentine	people	do	not	continue	to	suffer	price	increases.	The	next	few	years	are	crucial	in	determining	whether	the	holdout	solution	will	result	in	long-term	economic	gains	that	will	benefit	the	Argentine	economy	and,	most	importantly,	the	Argentine	people.			
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